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COMMENTS
THE CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF MARINE
POLLUTION FROM LAND-BASED SOURCES: AN
EFFECTIVE METHOD FOR ARBITRATING
INTERNATIONAL EFFLUENT
POLLUTION DISPUTES
Effluent pollution,' broadly defined as the flow of waste
materials into rivers and coastal seas,2 has reached alarming proportions. Arbitration, diplomacy, and litigation are among the
methods available to the international community to control and
combat this form of marine pollution. This comment will evaluate
each of these alternatives to determine which method appears
most effective in the control of transboundary pollution problems.
The Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from
Land-Based Sources,3 utilizing arbitration, presents guidelines for
a comprehensive, regionally organized attack in this facet of pollution control. However, it is necessary to describe effluent
1. Panel Report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and
Resources, 3 SCIENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 50 (1969). It is helpful to note
the classification of pollutants to indicate the substances with which concern has
been raised. The National Academy of Sciences broadly classifies pollutants entering the watercourses in the following manner: domestic sewage, infectious
agents, organic chemicals, sediments from erosion, radioactive wastes, heat from
industrial plants and power generating stations and other minerals and chemicals.
In Joint IMCO/FAO/UNESCO/WMO Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects
of Marine Pollution, Abstract of the Report of the First Session (London), U.N.
Doc. A/7750, pt. 1 at 3 (Nov. 10, 1969), this group of experts discussed marine
pollution in terms of domestic waste and industrial sewage; the latter was broken
into classifications of heavy metals, radioactive materials, pesticides, petroleum
based chemicals and pulp paper wastes.
2. AMERICAN CHEMICAL SOCIETY, CLEANING OuR ENVIRONMENT-THE
CHEMICAL BASIS FOR ACTION, at 104 (1969).
In 1968 in the United States alone,

manufacturing accounted for 31.1 trillion gallons of waste water, which contained
some 18 billion pounds of dissolved solids. This amount is approximately equal
to the amount produced by 360 million persons. This waste water is combined
with the domestic wastes and comprises the total amount of effluents.
3. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based
Sources, open for signature June 4, 1974, [reproduced in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 352 (1974)] [hereinafter cited as Marine Pollution Convention].
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pollution in greater detail to provide insight into the future uses
of the Marine Pollution Convention.
I.

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Into oceans and rivers, the nations of the world discard
industrial wastes, domestic sewage, and radioactive waste products,4 amounting to more than four billion tons annually. 5 These
pollutants are produced primarily by man's land-based industrial
activities. Once dumped into the marine environment, they
mingle with previously deposited wastes and are transported about
at the whim of the winds and the ocean currents. Thus, pollution
activities originating in one nation's waters may affect the quality
of the marine environment of an adjacent nation. However, the
dynamic processes of the ocean increase tremendously the difficulty of determining the pollution's source and hence the nation
liable to another whose marine environment has been altered as
a result of that pollution.
The compounds comprising effluents are chemically complex
and not easily degraded by bacterial action into their constituent
elements.'
Continuous dumping at a rate which exceeds the
degradation rate results in an ever-increasing amount of pollutants
being present in the marine environment. All these activities,
regardless of their geographic separation, contribute to the total
amount of pollutants in the seas. 7 Despite the ocean's seemingly
infinite capacity to absorb pollutants, many areas of the seas and
many rivers are becoming severely polluted.8
The areas of the marine environment affected most by
effluents are the coastal regions: estuaries, lagoons, marshes, bogs
and beaches. 9 These areas are fished heavily and produce large
amounts of food, while remaining important as sources of revenue
derived from tourism and recreational pursuits.
Toxic effluents have devastating effects on the food-produc4. Douglas, Environmental Problems of the Ocean: The Need for International Controls, 1 ENV'L LAw 149 (1971).
5. Wenk, The Physical Resources of the Oceans, 221 ScINTIFic AMMICAN
166 (1969).
6. American Chemical Society, supra note 2, at 106.
7. Marshall, Who is Responsible for Pollution, 57 A.B.A.J. 21, 22 (1971).
8. See generally T. Heyerdahl, Ocean Pollution Observed by Expedition Ra,
attached to IMCO Doe. OPS/Circ. 21 (Oct. 23, 1969).
9. Wenk, supra note 5, at 170.
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ing capabilities of the seas. 10 The marine food chain, a process
which ultimately produces food for human consumption, is extremely fragile and complex. One-celled plants, photo-plankton,
are the basis of life in the sea; it is upon these minute organisms
that the food chain depends for continued existence. Plankton
survive only in a narrow range of environmental conditions of light
penetration, temperature and salinity. These are the factors first
altered by the introduction of pollutants into the marine ecosystem. When the food chain is thus disrupted, the plankton die,
food resources decline and the total oxygen output of plankton is
decreased. This change is noted by man only as the amount of
food taken from the sea begins to drop.'1
Effluent pollution occurs mainly in the coastal waters. International law recognizes these waters as within the jurisdiction of
the coastal state.'" The activities which produce effluents likewise are sited within the territorial limits of the nation. Therefore, measures initiated by individual nations might appear to be
,the most logical way to approach the effluent pollution dilemma.
This assumption has been the basis of previous attempts at controlling effluents, but, thus far, these have had little success. To the
contrary, where the resource concerned is one common to many
nations, such as the seas, a multinational approach actually is more
desirable. It must be realized that the biosphere, the air, the
waters and the seas, are not parceled out in national segments to
be policed and protected by national regulations.'" Rather, the
biosphere is an entity which is best managed on a supra-national
basis.' 4
10. Holt, The Food Resources of the Oceans, 221 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 178
(1969).

11. See generally, P. Yentsch, Primary Production, I OCEANOGRAPHY &
MARINE BIOLOGY ANN. REV. 157 (1963).

12. Comment, Civil Liability for Oil Pollution, 10 HOUSTON L. REV. 394,

396-7 (1973).
13. Address by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Canada Leads the Fight

Against Pollution, STATEMENTS AND SPEECHEs No. 70/3, at 2 (April 15, 1970).
Prime Minister Trudeau's remarks were delivered in a speech which centered on
Canada's controversial Arctic Waters Anti-Pollution Act, which extends to 100
nautical miles Canada's jurisdiction over polluting vessels.
For views on this act, see Bilder, Canadian Artctic Waters Anti-Pollution
Prevention Act: New Stress on Law at Sea, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1970); Utton,
Arctic Waters PollutionAct, UNiv. B.C.L. Rav. 221 (1971).

14. This is because these common resources are treated as belonging to no
one nation, but are common to the entire world.
The Baltic Sea is so highly polluted in some areas that unilateral action may
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Effluent pollution is outside the scope of pollution addressed
by the law of the sea.'1

Conceptually, effluent pollution is

deliberate and continuous, whereas pollution caused by oil casualties is random and usually accidental. Effluent pollution, unfortunately, is usually invisible to a casual observer, while oil slicks
are highly visible. Effluent pollution demands different treatment
than does oil-based pollution of the seas.
Pollution of the high seas is pollution of res nullius; that is,
territory belonging to no nation. In contrast, effluent pollution
occurs generally within the territorial limits of a nation. The high
seas are administered through the law of the sea, a part of international law,'" while territorial waters of nations are controlled by
their respective systems of domestic law.' 7 For legal action to be
taken by a nation or organization in the territorial waters of
another nation, that body taking such action must have jurisdiction.
Many nations, especially those highly industrialized, face similar
types of problems regarding effluents."8 Since similar problems
usually suggest analogous remedies, the desire to solve these
common problems conceivably could be used to persuade such
nations that multilateral cooperation is the basis for the most effective course of action.
have no appreciable effect on the quality of the water. For example, the waters
which touch Sweden are so mercury laden that a total ban on the use of mercury
in Sweden will in all likelihood have little effect on the amount of mercury contamination in the waters which touch the shores of Sweden. Jemelov, The Menace of Mercury, 40 NEW SCIENTIST 627 (1968).
15. Wulf, International Control of Marine Pollution, 25 JAG. J. 93 (1971).

This comment does not deal with marine pollution other than land-based effluents.
Other types have been examined by various national and international groups
which have formulated controls for these polluting activities.
For a sample of measures relating to other than effluent pollution, see The
Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (1958):
International Convention of Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, open for
signature Nov. 29, 1969 [reproduced in 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 481 (1970)]; Oslo
Convention for Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, [reproduced in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 275 (1970)]; International Convention Relating to the Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties, [reproduced in 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 471 (1970)]; Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1250 et seq. (1972); Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (1964); Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§ 401 et seq. (1970); Arctic Waters Anti-Pollution Act, 18 ELIZ. II, c. 47 (1970)
(CANADA) [reproduced in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 543 (1970)].
16. D. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 251 (1970).
17. Id. at 155.
18. Burheme and Schoenbaum, The European Community and Management
of the Environment;a Dilemma, 13 NAT'L RES. J. 494 (1972).
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The highly industrialized and technologically advanced nations produce greater quantities and types of effluents.1 9 Actions
by these nations which are detrimental to the marine environment
can render meaningless unilateral actions by an adjacent nation
attempting to maintain or restore the quality of its marine environment. 20 In few areas has environmental consciousness matured
to a degree where an appeal will persuade a neighboring nation
to abate damaging activities. Cooperation must be the sine qua
non for progress in effluent abatement and control since international law lacks the enforcement powers inherent in municipal
law. 21 If individual nations are allowed to ignore the 2problem,
2
the oceans will be polluted to the detriment of all mankind.
Emerging nations undergoing rapid development demonstrate another reason why cooperation is essential. Attempts by
an industrialized nation 23 to institute standards for the control of
effluent pollution may be interpreted by these developing nations
as an attempt to restrict their social and economic development. 2 4
The developing nations maintain that such limitations are merely
a subterfuge to keep industrialized nations prosperous and to prevent poorer nations from becoming self-sufficient. It must be
recognized that developing nations face extremely difficult choices.
A nation's priorities must determine how seriously environmental factors are to be taken into consideration. For instance,
populous nations, such as the People's Republic of China or
India, presented with a choice between increasing food production through pollution producing fertilizers and maintaining a
clean environment, would inevitably choose increased food production. This becomes more certain with the current food
19. Douglas, supra note 4, at 150.
20. Report of the Joint Working Party of the Advisory Committee on Marine
Resources Research, The Scientific Committee on Ocean Research and the World
Meterological Organization, at 19 (1969). National pollution problems may be-

come international for a variety of reasons.

Improperly designed outfall struc-

tures may allow the effluent to be swept into the waters and onto the beaches

of neighboring states.

Commercial fishing in these waters will also be adversely

affected.

21. D. GREiG, supra note 16, at 45.
22. See Can NATO Defend the Environment?, 2 ENVT'L

AFFARS

670

(1973), noting the exclusion of East Germany from the Stoclkholm Conference
on the Environment.
23. Doud, InternationalEnvironmental Developments, Perceptions of Developing and Developed Countries, 12 NA'L RES. J. 520 (1972).
24. Bureheme and Schoenbaunm, supra note 18, at 401. See generally Doud,
supra note 23.
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shortages and widespread famine looming in the not-too-distant
future. Selection of food production over environmental considerations is a choice which trades short term welfare for long range
disaster. The nations which find themselves on the horns of such
a dilemma must be afforded a means which will permit logical,
rational use of natural resources while development is permitted
to continue at a rate consistent with the maintenance of a reasonably clean environment.
Emerging nations, as well as technologically advanced nations, must be educated to the fact that the goal of a clean marine
environment can result only where cooperation is made the
cornerstone on which programs for the abatement of effluent pollution rest. The peaceful means to accomplish such a goal-litigation, diplomacy, and arbitration-will each be examined and
compared to demonstrate why this comment concludes that arbitration is the most appropriate procedure for the attainment of that
goal..

II.

PROCEDURES TO CONTROL EFFLUENT POLLUTION

A.

Diplomacy

Diplomatic channels have drawbacks which prohibit their
effective use as a process through which to attack effluent pollution. It is asserted that diplomacy is not per se suited to the resolution of such controversies. Three aspects of conventional
diplomacy make it of doubtful worth in this area: (1) the lack
of speed and directness; (2) the impediment of national interests;
and (3) the suspicion by lesser developed nations of economic
coercion. These amount to formidable hurdles which must be
scaled before the merits of a problem may be addressed.2 5
The conduct of conventional diplomacy, with its exchanges
of notes, filing of formal protests and other cumbersome procedures, entails a relatively long period of time. The parties following such procedures are frequently presented with a fait accompli
by the time action is ready to be undertaken. The debates over
the location of -the meetings, the interjection of ancillary problems
and the formality of conventional diplomatic negotiations practically rule out a rapid assault on an effluent pollution situation by
25.
INT'L

Schacter and Serwer, Marine Pollution, Roles and Remedies, 65 AM. J.

L. 84 (1971).
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means of conventional diplomacy. 2 6 To be sure, there are exceptions to the leisurely pace which is usual in diplomatic relations,
but they are just that-exceptions. Upon closer analysis of such
exceptional circumstances it will be clear that rapid progress
comes about when the parties are ready to cooperate.
Since diplomatic relations are a reflection of a nations's political philosophy, diplomatic efforts are often colored by nationalistic
sentiments. An example of how national sentiments can subvert
diplomatic efforts at a peaceful resolution of a conflict is the "Cod
War" in the Northern Atlantic.2"
The United Kingdom and Iceland each claimed the right to
unlimited fishing in the waters surrounding Iceland. The root of
the conflict was Iceland's extension of its territorial waters to fifty
nautical miles from its coast. This action placed some of the traditional British fishing grounds within the territorial waters and, consequently, off-limits. The British fishing fleet continued to fish
in the disputed waters, even under the threats of action by
Icelandic naval vessels. Diplomatic efforts at settlement achieved
neligible progress, and finally British naval vessels accompanied
the fishing fleet. Each nation was adamant in its position, and
each appeared to have some precedent for its view.2"
Both nations depend on fishing for large contributions to
their economies, and, thus, the closure of the fishing grounds
would be a severe blow to the national economies of the respective
nations. In situations such as these, it is easy to see how national
sentiment can replace rational thought and serve as a bar to diplomatic settlement of disputes.
Another problem involves the suspicions on the part of the
developing nations that the environmental "problem" is an indirect
method for insuring that they remain in a subservient economic
29
position vis-a-vis the technologically well-developed nations.
Developing nations are the sites of some of the largest sources of
raw materials which are most needed by the industrialized nations
26. One needs only to take into account the difficulty of the selection of

the conference table for the Paris Peace Negotiations on Vietnam, and the refusal
of Arab States to deal with Israel on a face-to-face basis as examples of the difficulties attending diplomacy.

27. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland v. Iceland) [1973] I.C.J. 3 [reproduced in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1069 (1973)].

28. Id.
29. Doud, supra note 23, at 523.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1975

7

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1975], Art. 5
1975

ARBITRATING POLLUTION DISPUTES

to sustain their industrially based economies. As example of such
a situation is the Arab dominance of petroleum supplies necessary
to maintain the economies of the industrialized nations. It is not
hard to imagine that any diplomatically based program, no matter
how desperately needed, would arouse these nations' suspicions
that the industrialized nations desire a secure source for their
necessary raw materials and are not truly concerned with environmental quality.
The separation of the proposed remedial measures from the
political arena is necessary if realistic progress is to be expected. 30
Allowing political considerations to hinder the formulation of antipollution measures dooms the use of diplomacy in this area. Even
if outright failure is averted, any agreement derived from such
conditions, in all probability, will be an impotent formality. Any
program which limits effluents requires technology, and would
cost developing nations a great deal of time and money, thus impeding development. In all likelihood, these nations would ignore
unduly restrictive requirements, resulting in unchecked pollutant
flow into the seas.
In sum, diplomacy thus employed seems to create more
problems than it is capable of resolving. The search for an effective method must continue.
B.

Litigation

Selection of a court of competent jurisdiction, determination
of the proper party-plaintiff and lack of an appropriate theory of
liability upon which to base a suit all are factors which hinder
effective use of litigation in effluent pollution disputes."1 Litigation, traditionally employed for -the resolution of conflict, focuses
its attention mainly on injuries which have occurred in the past,
not on injuries which are yet to happen. Treatment of injuries
which have already caused damage is only one part of the total
approach which effluent pollution demands. In addition to treat30. See generally Everdhein and Kandone, Ocean Science in the U.N. Politi-

cal Arena, 3 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 473 (1972); For a compilation of claims to
width of the Territorial Seas, see 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 516 (1969).
31. Schacter and Serwer, supra note 25, at 105. It is the responsibility of
the individual nations to institute an action at international law on the basis that
the claimant nation has suffered injury in its own territory. Serious questions
arise in such an action in regard to the amount of injury necessary to sustain such
an action, and how stringent the standard of proof would be.
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ing any past injuries, concentrated effort must be made to stop
the injuries before they occur.
Before any attempt can be made at determination of parties
to an action and an appropriate theory of suit, the question of
selection of a court with competent jurisdiction arises. In litigation submitted to the International Court of Justice, the sole basis
on which the Court may assume jurisdiction is upon the consent
of the parties.3 2 This result stems from the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, a doctrine universally held by all nations."3 In the
absence of an agreement to submit the dispute to the International
Court for resolution, it is impossible for the would-be plaintiff to
bring the other party before the Court. 4 The lack of jurisdiction
of one nation over another nation for acts done in the latter's territory has been a major stumbling block to the effectiveness of international litigation."
An example of how this principle of consent-based jurisdiction can work to the disadvantage of the Court is presented by
the actions of Canada in enacting the Artic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. 6 Prior to the passage of this controversial Act, the
Canadian Parliament revoked the Canadian agreement to submit
to the International Court's jurisdiction in matters concernmng
marine pollution. This eliminated the jurisdictional basis of the
International Court as far as Canada was concerned, and facilitated passage of Canada's more stringent anti-pollution measures.3 7 Such actions should not be construed to violate international law, for the actions are well within the discretion of each
sovereign nation. They do, however, impede the use of litigation.
The jurisdictional problem is further complicated because as
well as attaining jurisdiction over the parties, the international
character of the claim must be established. This is clouded by
the many conflicting claims made by coastal nations regarding the
width of the territorial seas.38 The width of the zone in which
32. I.C.J. STAT., art. 36, para. 2, 3.
33. Falk, Toward a World Order Respectful of the Global Ecosystem, I
ENVT'L AFFAIRS 251, at 253 (1971).
34. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL

LAw, CASES AND MATrIALS

63 (3d ed.

1971).
35. D. GREiG, supra note 16, at 165. See also, Case of the S.S. Lotus [1927]
P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 10.
36. Address by Pierre Trudeau, supra note 13.
37. Bilder, Canadian Arctic Waters Anti-Pollution Prevention Act: New
Stress on the Law of the Sea, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1970).

38. This was the center of attention at the Conference on the Law
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the large majority of effluent cases occurs is not as broad as even
the most limited of definitions of the territorial seas.3 9 This fact
separates effluent pollution issues from the involved and difficult
issues surrounding the territorial sea debates and removes the
necessity of solving territorial sea issues before attacking the
effluent problems.
Jurisdictional concepts regarding the international character
of the claim have been refined to greater clarity by the resolution
of the Corfu Channel Case40 and the Trail Smelter Case.4' The
decision in Trail Smelter states, in part, that "no state has the
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner
as to cause injury . . . in or to the territory of another or to the
properties or persons therein . . ."' This affords a basis for jurisdiction in trans-boundary pollution suits.
Apparently, suit may be brought and the polluting nation may
be held accountable only when the resulting injury to the territory
of another nation is demonstrated by clear evidence.4 3 This is circuitous logic. When injury is clearly evident, no problem exists
with jurisdiction; when the injury is not so clearly evident, no jurisdiction attaches. It is the function of the litigation to determine
the merits of the controversy. If demonstration of an injury
remains a condition precedent to the attachment of jurisdiction,
the function of litigation will be supplanted by jurisdictional considerations. There should be a more liberal basis upon which to
bring suit, and it should be within the competence of the tribunal
to determine whether the injury is one of such a nature that the
polluting nation should be held accountable.
It seems clear that jurisdiction which rests on such an
evanescent base as consent leaves a great deal to be desired. Since
jurisdiction here is problematic, litigation's value as a method for
determination of effluent issues is severly diminished. Jurisdicof the Sea at Caracas in 1974. The problem stems from two seemingly antagonistic positions: extension of fishing rights out to 200 nautical miles from the
coast and desire for free passage through the world's straits; see N.Y. Times, Aug.
21, 1974, at 1, col. 4.
39. D. GRmG, supra note 16, at 149.
40. Corfu Channel Case [1949] I.C.J. 4 [reproduced in 43 AM. J. INT'L L.
558 (1949)].
41. Trail Smelter Arbitration, (U.S. v. Canada) [1939] 33 AM. J. INT'L
L. 182.
42. Id.
43. Sepulveda, Mexican-American International Water Quality Problems;
Prospects and Prospectives, 12 NAT'L REs. J. 487, 492 (1971).
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tional issues aside, standing to sue remains as a hindrance to
litigation's usefulness as a tool to eliminate effluent pollution.
Serious questions also arise concerning the ascertainment of
the identity of the injured party and the determination of who shall
initiate the action.4 4 The issue of selection of a party to act as
the plaintiff is difficult. For example, when coastal fishing stocks
are depleted by pollution, is the fisherman or the nation the
injured party? Obviously the fisherman has suffered direct injury
by loss of his earnings, but so has the nation, albeit in a less direct
manner, through injury to its territorial waters. According to
current concepts in international law, individuals have no standing
to initiate suit in international forums; 45 such suits must be brought
by their respective nations. 4
This concept is particularly unacceptable in effluent pollution cases because the fate of the suit
is taken out of the hands of the individual and placed squarely
in the hands of his government. The government may, in turn,
decide that a minor incident is not worth the disruption in international relations which may be caused by it. Political considerations, which have already been seen to be detrimental to the
efficiency of the actions, are thus interjected into the situation.
Even if the party-plaintiff is satisfactorily selected, the determination of the defendant is made difficult by the problems of
identification of the source of the damaging pollution. Assuming
that these difficulties are overcome, and a suit is brought, there
still is the question of how to handle awards for future damages.
Such damages would almost certainly be deemed speculative, for
which compensation would be a nominal award.47
If these problems are overcome, the question of a viable
theory upon which to base such a suit remains to be resolved.
Consideration of the "classical" basis upon which liability might
conceivably rest evidences another disadvantage of litigation in the
area of effluent control and abatement. This is clear from
Professor Oppenheim's 4s assertion that an act of a nation does not
44. See generally Rogers Alice in Wonderland World of Standing, 1 ENVT'L
LAW 169 (1971); Comment Standing and Administrative Agencies, The Changing
Concepts of Judicial Review, 32

IA.

L. REv. 634 (1971).

45. See Scanwell Labs, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 861-73 (D.C. Cir.
1970) which describes aptly the confusion of the American judiciary regarding
the issue of standing.
46. T. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM ATI-ILNS TO LOCARNO (1972).
47. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 602 (4th ed. 1970).
48. Professor Oppenhein, an English jurist, authored INTERNATIONAL LAW,
a standard work in the field. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th
ed. 1948).
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constitute an international delinquency unless it is committed willfully or through culpable negligence, 9 however injurious it may
be to another nation.
By basing a suit for effluent pollution damage in nuisance,
the result may well be that the pollution-producing nation may be
granted a de facto license to pollute. This conclusion results from
application of "classical" nuisance analysis, in which a balance
could be struck by the court between the harm resulting, and the
economic benefit derived from the polluting activity. 50 The
technologically developed nations pollute the most, and they
depend heavily upon manufacturing for their economic vitality. 51
Therefore the chance appears remote that the economic benefit
to these countries, even with consequent polluting activities, would
be outweighed by a consideration of the harm done to the environ52
ment.
Similarly, the doctrine of negligence is inapposite for determination of liability for injury caused by effluent pollution.
Proof of proximate cause would be a formidable obstacle in any
attempt to persuade a court to arrive at the decision that the injury
should be compensated. 3 This element is essential in every
negligence action. However, the effects of the sea, such as
salinity, chemical action on the pollutants, and the currents and
tides, make such proof prohibitively difficult.5 4 As soon as the
pollutants enter the marine environment, the sea begins to act
upon them by spreading and disguising them,55 and an effort to
analyze the unique processes which determine the final products
of the pollution would be a monumental task.
Even assuming proximate cause could be adequately shown,
the difficulty of proof of the existence of a duty and its breach
49. Id. at 293.
50. W. PRossER, supra note 47, at 581; Commoner, A Current Problem in
the Environmental Crisis, Mercury Pollution and Its Legal Implications, 4 NAT'L
REs. LAWYER 139 (1971).
51. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 4; Doud, supra note 23, at 520.
52. See generally Goldie, InternationalPrinciples of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283 (1971).
53. Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What to Do While Waiting for
Washington, 5 HARv. Civ. RiHTs---Civ. LIB. L. REa. 32 (1970); Reitze, Private
Remedies for Environmental Wrongs, 5 SUFFOLK L. REv. 779 (1971).
54. Newman, Oil on Troubled Waters: International Control of Marine
Pollution, 2 J. MARrrIME L. AND COMM. 349-51 (1971).
55. Id. at 352; see generally Comment, Ocean Pollution: An Examination
of the Problem and an Appeal for InternationalCooperation, 7 SAN DiEGo L. REv.

574 (1970).
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effectively prevents pursuit of an action founded in negligence.
A duty to refrain from polluting the seas hitherto has not been
widely promulgated by courts. Since the decision that a duty is
owed even to the citizens of the polluting state is an open question
at the present time, it follows a fortiori that a decision of a similar
nature in respect of the citizens of a neighboring state is, at least
for the present time, unlikely. If proof of a duty and causation
stands 56 as a hinderance to an effective negligence action, perhaps
strict liability may be a more appropriate concept.
Under a strict liability theory, the essential element in liability
is a consideration whether injury results from an activity unduly
dangerous or an activity which by its nature is "ultra-hazardous"
as compared to the activity and character of the surrounding
area. 5 7 Whether pollutants from a city or district primarily
engaged in manufacturing would be inappropriate to the character
of the surrounding area is a question of fact, but it seems unlikely
that these activities would be so considered. 58
Based upon the problems related in the foregoing discussion,
it seems that litigation as a process does not fulfill the requirements for an effective vehicle by which to attack effluent
pollution. The failure of litigation to provide a viable means of
solving these effluent problems5 9 emphasizes the need for a
solution-oriented alternative to litigation.
C.

Arbitration

International arbitration, originated by the ancient Greeks,60
6
has been effectively employed as a means to settle disputes. '
According to accepted international legal principles, arbitration
has been considered a type of judicial process in which it is the
function of the party or parties acting as arbitrator to arrive at a
solution to the problem submitted.62 International arbitration is
56. Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).

57. W. PROSSER, supra note 47, at 406.
58. For a definition of an ultra-hazardous activity, see
oND) OF TORTS § 519 (1967), and citations contained therein.

RESTATEMENT (SEC-

59. In fact, there is no record of a case heard before either the P.C.I.J. or

I.C.J. arising out of inter-state water pollution. 3 M. WHITMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1044 (1969).
60. T. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM ATHENS TO LocARUo (1949).
61. P. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOME CURRENT ILLUSIONS 97
(1944).
62. T. RALSTON, supra note 60, at 96.
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best suited to a narrow range of situations: interpretation of a
treaty or convention, formulation of the nature or extent of reparation due for a breach of such an international obligation, determination of the facts surrounding such a breach of international
obligation, and resolution of any general question of international
law submitted by the parties.13 Experience has demonstrated that
international arbitration is most successful in solving disputes
which are concerned with the interpretation of a treaty or convention.6 4 Arbitration can be used as a substitute for litigation in
situations where no suitable court exists to address the problem,
or can provide a completely separate process where a competent
court exists, but the parties have concluded that an arbitral
tribunal can complete the task at hand in a more acceptable
manner.6 5 A definition will clarify the process under discussion:
Arbitration means the determination of a dispute between
States through a legal decision of one or more umpires, other
than the International Court of Justice chosen by the parties
to the dispute. 6
According to this definition, the arbitral tribunal must be a body
other than the International Court of Justice. There is ample
reason for this requirement. The rules used by arbitral tribunals
in some cases run counter to those rules used by courts, especially
with regard to evidentiary matters. Another fact which makes the
Court inappropriate is that its decisions cannot be enforced by or
against the litigants before it. 7 Such enforcement problems are
relegated to a place of minor importance when arbitration is the
chosen method. This is so because in international arbitration,
awards are considered final and binding on the parties, unless a
contrary intent is specified by the agreement.6 '
Arbitration's attributes make it preferable to diplomacy or
litigation. Because diplomatic efforts toward solution of a problem necessitate inclusion of much in a political vein, arbitration
63.

P. MOORE, supra note 61, at 96.

64.

W. FRIEDMAN, 0.

LISSITZYN,

&

R. PUGH,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW,

CASES

AND MATERIALS 262 (1971).

65. L.

OPPENHEIM,

supra note 48, at 61.

66. Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
1907 Hague Court Reports, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Univ. Press (1916).
67. W. BISHOP, supra note 34, at 63. See also, Truman Declaration Concerning the U.S. Submission to I.C.J. Jurisdiction, 61 Stat. 1218, 15 U.S. DEPT.
STATE BULL. 452 (1946); H. HAMBRO, Some Observations on the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the InternationalCourt of Justice, [1948] BRIT. Y. B. INT'L 133.
68. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 48, at 26.
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can provide an effective and, more importantly, equitable alternative to the dilemma of deadlocked diplomatic negotiations. 9 By
its very existence, the arbitration agreement may be a helpful
element in inducing the parties to abandon untenable positions
and seek agreement. 70 The parties can maintain their political
identity, but submission of the dispute to arbitration signals a
preference for solution, rather than satisfaction with stalemate.
The parties can provide that the proceedings remain confidential
to minimize possible political repercussions.7 1 Thus, submission
of a conflict to arbitration minimizes political maneuvering and
72
permits concentration on the merits of -thecontroversy.
Since the arbitration process incorporates the disputants into
the decision-making process, the working arrangement may be as
formal or informal as the parties themselves desire; this is in sharp
contrast to the situation of a diplomatic negotiation which is highly
dependent on the formalities of the exchange. In contrast to
diplomacy, arbitration does not seem to rank the importance of
the subject matter under discussion by the title of the persons engaged in the negotiations. Because of its participatory nature, arbitration can remain effective without the necessity of
highly placed representatives. Arbitration appears to be a relatively apolitical process, which is able to continue functioning in
the face of political changes in the nations which the members
of the tribunal represent.73
The major distinction between arbitration and litigation is
found in the composition of the decision-making body. 7 In litigation, the parties appear before a permanent judicial body to plead
their case but they have no voice in the actual decision. Arbitration, on the other hand, requires a representative from each of
the parties to the dispute to be a member of the tribunal which
formulates the award. Its participatory nature helps to instill
69. One only need remember the difference in the diplomacy of De Gaulle's
post-World War II France and the isolation of the American policy immediately

preceding World War I.
70. DAVID DAVIS MEMORIAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, REPORT
OF A STUDY GROUP ON

PEACEFUL SETrLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES,

18

(1966).
71. id. at 17.
72. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 48, at 60.

73. Id.
74. Compare I.CJ. STAT., art. 36 with The Marine Pollution Convention,
supra note 3, Annex B, art. 3.
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confidence in the tribunal as it insures objectivity and impartiality
which can only aid in demonstrating to the participants -the desirability of arbitration as a problem-solving procedure. Arbitration
presents a viable alternative to litigation and diplomacy in the solution of disputes unsuited to resolution within framework of
plaintiff and defendant.
Jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is usually dealt with by
the parties during the adoption and ratification of the document
7" that is, the arbitration
which contains the compromis d' arbitrage,
agreement. This is actually the first step in the arbitration
process. The disputants, at the time of submission cannot
challenge the jurisdiction, being estopped by their prior ratification
of the agreement.7 6 Even absence of a party does not hinder the
ability of the tribunal to dispose of the case.
The international arbitration process usually follows the
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Arbitral Procedure, 77 which sets forth general guidelines for procedure. This
guide vests the procedure with normality and authority lacking in
an ad hoc tribunal, and often is included in the convention or other
document in which the agreement to arbitrate is located. Nations
still cling to the notion that a "court" for arbitration removes too
much of their sovereignty; 78 thus, arbitration provisions are found
in separate conventions, each addressing a unique facet of international law.
The arbitration process is easily adaptable to effective use in
almost any area of international law. The following discussion
demonstrates how arbitration can be used to deal effectively with
effluent pollution.
III.

THE CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF MARINE
POLLUTION FROM LAND-BASED SOURCES:
EFFECTIVE USE OF ARBITRATION

Present international agreements and municipal programs
have made moderate progress in many areas toward pollution control, with the notable exception of the area of effluents. 79 One
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 42 (1959).
HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 639

75. R. SIMPSON,

76. 5 M.

77. [19581 2 Y.B.
78. Id.

INT'L

L.

COMM'N

(1973).

82; U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/113.

79. The International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, [reproduced in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 25
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of the few international agreements containing a provision for

liability, The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution, 7 restricts its liability provisions to pollution caused by
ships and other sea-going vessels.8 0 This convention's application
is limited to oil-based pollution."' As a rule, conventions are
extremely difficult to modify, so modification of this convention
82
appears unlikely.
Other international agreements 3 exist which address the
pollution caused by agents other than oil.8 4 However, the purpose
clauses of these conventions usually do not contain a power to deal
with pollution of the type under consideration here. It is not clear

whether the paucity of innovative programs in this area of pollution control results from the complexity of effluent problems or
is due to a decision to attempt to solve simpler situations first.
Whatever the reasons may be, the fact is that an international
agreement which comprehensively attacks effluent pollution per
se does not now exist.
(1970)] seems to embark upon a desirable course of action with the statement in
article 11(4) (a-c) :
a. maritime coastal, port or estuarine activities including fishing activities constituting an essential means of livelihood of the persons concerned,
b. tourist activities and attractions of the area concerned,
c. the health of the coastal population and the well-being of the area
concerned, ....
However, upon further examination it is noted that the intersts are limited
by the fact that there must be an oil spill before the Convention can come into
effect. Id. at art. 1.
The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 2 ELIZ II 18-19, C.
47 [reproduced in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 543 (1970)]; applies only to polluttants entering the area from vessels within the jurisdiction of the Canadian Act.
The heart of the Act is the "pollution control zone" which extends 100 nautical
miles from the coast pollution jurisdiction. No mention is noted with regard to
effluent pollutants from land-based activities.
80. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,

done at Brussels November 29, 1969, [reproduced in 9

INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

45 (1970)].
81. Id.
82. Id.
83.. P. JESSUP, THE PRICE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 59 (1971).
84. Agreement on the Implementation of a European Project on Pollution,
on the Topic: "Sewage Sludge Processing," [1972] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 114 (CMO.
5122) [reproduced in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 9 (1973)].
Article I states:
The signatory nations agree to coordinate their efforts in the project
which is to be undertaken to compare the methods of processing and disposing of sewage sludge practiced in the different nations.
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However, it must be pointed out that the Marine Pollution
Convention does attempt to grapple with this problem,8 5 and it
will now be demonstrated how this agreement can be the basis
around which a comprehensive attack on the effluent problem
may be centered. 86 The Marine Pollution Convention's adoption
by the Conference on Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources
evidences that the participants have finally realized the gravity of
the threat which effluent pollution poses to the marine environhent.8 T The parties88 to the Marine Pollution Convention have
pledged to cooperate in concerted action to counter effluent pollution at global, regional and national levels.89 In addition to this
pledge of cooperation, the Marine Pollution Convention is notable
for two other features.
One of these features is that disputes which arise concerning
the application and interpretation of the Marine Pollution Convention, which cannot be otherwise settled, shall be submitted to
arbitration upon request of one of the parties to the dispute. 0
This demonstrates the desire of the participating nations to solve
their disputes regarding effluent pollution without reliance on the
judicial process of litigation. The point of view of this regionally
based agreement has evolved into a viewpoint which has shifted
away from pure nationalism to regionalism; a subtle, though
extremely important shift where common resources are under discussion. The ability to address trans-boundary disputes on a
multi-national basis greatly increases the chances for effective
action.
Another feature of the Marine Pollution Convention is that
the waters in which its provisions shall apply are multi-national. 91
The Marine Pollution Convention is one of -the few instances in
which nations have relinquished even a small portion of their
sovereign rights in deference to an international agreement. This
provision alone makes the Marine Pollution Convention a landmark in the battle against marine pollution.
85. The Marine Pollution Convention, supra note 3.
86. Id.
87. Id., Preamble, art. 2.
88. Id. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom participated in the Conference out of which

came the Marine Pollution Convention.

Italy attended as an observer.

89. Id., Preamble.
90. Id., art. 21 and Annex B.

91. Id., art. 2.
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The waters in which the Marine Pollution Convention
authority will be recognized include "the high seas, the territorial
seas, and even rivers up to the freshwater limit. '9 2 The inclusion
of the territorial seas and rivers is particularly important for it is
in these waters that the great majority of effluents enter the marine
93
environment.
Since the parties have agreed to waive national jurisdiction
over territorial waters for the purpose of the Marine Pollution
Convention, 9 4 difficulties centered around jurisdictional concepts
appear to have been solved. Such action infers that the contracting parties have finally realized that the elimination of effluent
pollution is a need of higher priority than the assertion of national
sovereignty in territorial waters. The parties, it is asserted, have
acted well in this regard and will be rewarded with progress in
the struggle against effluents' despoilment of the marine environment. It is ironic that jurisdictional concepts, ordinarily the most
troublesome, are the problems most easily resolved by the agreement of the parties. 9 5 The goal9 6 of the Marine Pollution Convention is the elimination of pollution by certain compounds 9 7, based
upon considerations of persistence, toxicity and concentration in
the food chain. 98 The location and quantity of matter discharged
are also to be noted. However, as admirable as this goal may be,
it will not be accomplished without disputes. Cooperation, a
necessary element for success in such ventures, has been built into
the Marine Pollution Convention, through its arbitration provisions. 99
92. Id., art. 3(a) wherein the treaty provides:
Maritime area - means the high seas, the territorial seas of the contracting parties and waters on the landward side of the base line from which
the width of the territorial seas are measured, extending, in the case of
watercourses up to the freshwater limit.
93. Id., art. 3(c):
i). through watercourses,
ii). from the coast, including introduction through underwater or other
pipelines.
iii). from man-made structures placed under the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party within the limits of the area to which the present
Convention applies.
94. Id., art. 1,art. 4.
95. Id., Preface states: "CONSIDERING that the common interests of the
states concerned with the same marine area should induce them to cooperate at
regional or subregional levels."
96. Id., art. 1(1).
97. ld., Annex A.
98. ld.
99. id., art. 21, which provides: Any dispute between the Contracting Par-
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Arbitration has been selected as the method to resolve these
anticipated disputes and guides for the conduct of such arbitration
are annexed to the Marine Pollution Convention.'0 0 These guidelines require the submission to arbitration of any dispute concerning the application or interpretation of the Marine Pollution
Convention upon the request of one contracting party to another. 1 ' Upon such a petition an arbitral tribunal shall be
constituted, based upon the specific complaint as included in the
call for arbitration. 10 2
The arbitral tribunal is composed of three members. Each
of the parties to the dispute appoints one arbitrator and, by agree03
ment, they appoint the third person who acts as the chairman.
The tribunal thus constituted can institute its own rules of
procedure, limited only by the Marine Pollution Convention's
recognition of international law.
It is unfortunate that this arbitration provision is not as comprehensive as it might be. The method by which the arbitral
tribunal is constituted is poorly equipped to deal with some
expected situations. Following this provision strictly in a more
than two-nation dispute would precipitate an undesirable situation
where not all nations would be represented on the tribunal. This
means that national representatives would have to represent more
than one nation. This conflict of interest clearly violates the con10 4
cept of participatory decision-making inherent in arbitration.
Arbitration demands that each party have a representative on the
tribunal. An alternative method of composition would allow each
party to seat one representative, regardless of the number of
countries involved.' 05 The tribunal would then be completed by
the selection of three or four neutral arbitrators by the parties to
the dispute, whichever would result in an odd number on the
ties relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention . . . shall at
the request of any of the Parties be submitted to arbitration ...
100. Id., Annex B.
101. Id., art. 21.
102. Id., Annex B, art. 2.
103. Id., Annex B, art. 3.
104. Id., Hague Convention, supra note 66, art. 37, states: "International arbitration has for its object the settlement of disputes between States by judges of
their own choosing and on the basis of respect for the law." (emphasis added).

105. See, e.g., Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States of 1966 38, entered into force October 14,

1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159: Constitution of the Universal Postal
Union, Article 32, entered into force January 1, 1966, 16 U.S.T. 1291 (1964).
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tribunal, 10 6 a desirable procedure to safeguard against deadlocked
votes.
However, the method of selection of the tribunal does not
constitute the major defect of the arbitration provision. Rather,
the fact that the tribunal is composed on a case-by-case basis hinders the most effective use of arbitration by the panel. Disputes
arising from the Marine Pollution Convention will necessarily be similar in nature, and through repeated submission of
such disputes to a standing arbitration tribunal, expertise in dealing with them could be developed. Establishing such a permanent corps of arbitrators would provide the opportunity for
development of expertise, and failure to do so prohibits maximum
use of the arbitral concept. A permanent corps of arbitrators,
from which the neutral arbitrators can be drawn, would insure impartiality and objectivity. Objectivity is absolutely necessary to
instill confidence in the arbitration process. Confidence in the
objectivity and impartiality of the arbitral tribunal will increase the
willingness of the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration for
solution. 10 7 Through regularity of decision, a type of informal
stare decisis could be developed to aid in the decision of the disputes. The approach to a problem which was taken by the arbitral
tribunal in a certain fact situation would be a matter of record
available to the parties. Demonstrating the procedure by which
the dispute was satisfactorily resolved would provide parties to
subsequent similar disputes an incentive to take analogous action
without the necessity of submitting to arbitration. This is important because the more rapidly effluent pollution is abated the smaller
the amount of damage that will be done to the marine ecosystem.
The arbitration provision states that the tribunal shall render
an award in accordance with international law and rules contained
in the Marine Pollution Convention. 0 a This is another important
factor which implies that the parties have opted for international
law in lieu of municipal law as the legal system upon which decisions shall be based. Combination of this with the provision
calling for the establishment of an integrated planning policy' 0 9
106. International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Arbitral Procedure,
supra note 74, art. 4(2).
107. P. JEssoP, supra note 83, at 52.
108. The Marine Pollution Convention, supra note 3, Annex B, art. 5.
109. Id., art. 6(2)(d).
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demonstrates the real advantage of the Marine Pollution Convention.
Through consistency of decision and incorporation of research submitted as evidence, a de facto planning policy can be
initiated and effected by the tribunal. A court, especially the
International Court of Justice, is unable to monitor and gather data
about such a situation unless it relates to a pending suit. The
Marine Pollution Convention establishes a series of permanent
monitoring stations, designed to assess the existing level of pollu110
tion and to evaluate the effectiveness of its remedial measures.
These independent sources permit data to be transmitted to the
tribunal or any other organization relatively free of national bias.
The individual signatories to the Marine Pollution Convention
have agreed to share any data collected."' The tribunal can
effectively employ the data thus submitted to formulate its awards.
Submission of best-available data allows integration of the plans
and policies of the Marine Pollution Convention into a compreContinued monitoring of the procedures
hensive approach."'
employed to measure the effectiveness of remedial actions has
dual significance. Primarily, the contracting parties are assured
that ineffective measures will not be repeated, and secondarily,
feedback from the monitoring network allows modification of ineffective remedial measures to be initiated rapidly.
Unfortunately, the language of the Marine Pollution Convention is not clear when it mentions "awards"."' "Awards" are
mentioned in several places, but no adequate description of them
is given. They can be categorized generally as awards of rights
and awards of money damages. Awards of rights usually presuppose national integrity, designating one nation to be in a superior
legal position. This is not consistent with the nature of arbitration, nor the co-operative spirit of the Marine Pollution Convent
tion.1 14 The goal is to eliminate pollution, not to establish the
hierarchy of national rights.
Awards of damages in money have both positive and negative
110. Id., art. 11.
111. Id., Preface, art. 1(2), 6, 10.
112. Joyner & Joyner, Prescriptive Administrative Proposal; International
Machinery for Control of the High Seas, 8 INT'L LAwYER 57 (1974).
113. The Marine Pollution Convention, supra note 3, Annex B, art. 7.
114. Id., art. 1.
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aspects. 1 15 Compensatory damage judgments should be viewed
as merely an interim measure and not regarded as a satisfactory
final solution. Compensation for damages ignores the basic problem which demands solution. A wealthy country, heavily dependent on pollution-producing industries, would probably prefer
paying damages to limiting industrial activity. The result of such
a decision would be continued pollution, a situation which is totally
unacceptable. The scenario becomes less desirable with the
possibility of cancelling counterclaims. For example, State A,
awarded damages for pollution injuries caused by State B, is sued
by State B for damages caused it by State A. It is entirely possible
that these claims would offset each other and the real award would
be minimal in both cases, and pollution would continue with little
or no actual monetary penalty imposed.
It is proposed that if awards include money damages, they
should be paid at least in part to the commission established by
the Marine Pollution Convention.1 16 The duties of this commission consist of formulation and implementation of abatement
measures.117 The arbitral tribunal should cooperate with the
commission in the formulation of abatement measures using funds
derived from awards to perpetuate the monitoring program, to
financially support the program, and to educate the parties to seek
solutions for effluent problems.
The disregard of a decision by a party to the dispute
sabotages any beneficial effect that such a decision may have had.
In order to sanction effectively, whether a state or an individual,
the sanctioning body must have the power of enforcement. 118
Authority is derived either from an enforcement power external
to the body, such as a police force, or from agreement by the
parties to be bound by the decision rendered. The Marine Pollution Convention's controls are based upon agreement by the
parties. In international arbitration, unless the contrary is noted,
arbitral awards are deemed final and bind the parties involved. 119
The Marine Pollution Convention expressly stated that its arbitration awards are binding. 2 ° Enforcement powers established by
115. Doud, supra note 23, at 524.
116. The Marine Pollution Convention, supra note 3, art. 15.

117. Id., art. 16.
118.

Burheme and Schoenbaum, supra note 18, at 496.

119. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 48, at 26.
120. The Marine Pollution Convention, supra note 3, Annex B, art. 7(1).
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the parties' 2 ' are consistent with an arbitration-based approach to
disputes.
Participation by the parties in solution of disputes implies that
the parties do not desire an entity other than the disputants and
the arbitrators to become involved. This desire for lack of foreign
participation in the decision-making process is one possible
reason for the apparent reluctance of some to submit disputes to
the International Court of Justice.' 2 2 By permitting the disputing
nations to participate in the decision rendering, the nations are
individually asserting sovereignty, rather than ceding it as must
be done before the International Court of Justice.
Protracted dialectics which hinder the solution of effluent
disputes are undesirable. The decision making process must be
as efficient as possible -to avoid delays. Parliamentary delays and
those caused by inefficient data collection must be avoided. The
Marine Pollution Convention minimizes these possible problems "2' 3 and evidences a desire to arrive at solutions. A majority
vote is used as the proportion necessary to affect a decision, 24
and applies to questions of substance as well as matters of proa party will not be considered an
cedure. Even absence of
25
impediment to a decision.1
The scope of the Marine Pollution Convention 26 encompasses an area large enough to have substantial impact on effluent
pollution, yet small enough to permit effective administration of
its programs. Regional attacks seem the most promising approach
to effluent problems. Unilateral action is ineffectively narrow,
and global organization does not take into consideration problems
peculiar to any one area. Effective operation of this regional
agreement would help to overcome both of these problems.
Two important purposes can be served by the Marine Pollution Convention. First, successful resolution of disputes through
the Marine Pollution Convention's arbitration procedure will
demonstrate conclusively that arbitration is a desirable alternative
to either diplomacy or litigation. The international legal basis of
the decisions permits the awards to be analyzed and employed by
121. Id.
122. I.C.J. STAT.
123. The Marine
124. Id., Annex
125. Id., Annex

arts. 2, 31, 54.
Pollution Convention, supra note 3, Annex B, art. 6.
B, art. 6(1).
B, art. 6(5).

126. Id., art. 3(a).
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other like tribunals. The adaptability of the arbitral concept to
the peculiarities of a situation is evident, since arbitration can perform as extensive or as limited a function as the parties may agree.
Second, and more importantly, meaningful efforts toward the
prevention of effluent pollution can be made. This accomplishment is the ultimate goal, 2 7 regardless of the method employed.
Of the alternatives examined, arbitration is the only one which
places consideration of the merits of the problem above all other
considerations. Impressive trappings of power are eschewed in
favor of effective action.
Nations disturbed by widespread despoilment of the marine
environment would be well-advised to observe closely the efforts
of the Marine Pollution Convention. Nations such as the United
12
States have realized that regional organization is preferred.
Particular note should be taken by those nations of the operation
of this arbitration process. The technology to control effluents
is currently available, and arbitration, as contained in conventions
such as the Marine Pollution Convention, seems a most effective
way to integrate this technology with legal action to alleviate the
problem of effluents.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The international arbitration process can help to remove

many of the major impediments to solution of effluent pollution
disputes. Cooperation is inherent in the arbitration procedure.
The arbitration forum is designed to formulate equitable solutions

to problems affecting a wide sector of the world's community.
Participatory decision-making fosters trust and communication

among the parties to a dispute, a desirable situation in any relationship.
Of the methods examined, arbitration is the process best

suited to a rapid, effective solution of effluent pollution disputes.
It takes into account international legal principles, and employs
technical expertise in the approach to problems; it acts as a hybrid
127.. Id., art. 1.
128. Letter from Robert McManus, Oceans Section Director, Environmental
Protection Agency (on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.) which states that the United
States is committed to the goals of the Marine Pollution Convention. An example
of this commitment is the Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. 1251
et seq. (1972) which in section 7 authorizes the President of the United States
to seek international action for control and abatement of marine pollution.
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of court and legislature, and combined with the research capability
of the Commission, it is the catalyst for effective action in this
area. No novel procedures need be formulated; arbitration can
succeed at its present stage of development.
The Marine Pollution Convention, one of the initial attempts
employing arbitration as its main problem-solving process, is
obviously not a panacea for the world's effluent problems. However, it is certainly the most comprehensive action of this type to
date. No other method approaches the flexibility or potential
speed of action of arbitration. Few, if any, preconceived misconceptions clutter the notion of what arbitration is or what it is
capable of accomplishing.
It is for these reasons that the Marine Pollution Convention
is an important contribution to the international arbitration concept, and should be given support.
Richard H. Busby
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